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THESIS

**SHAPING FUTURE AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES:
ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WEST
AFRICAN PEACE FORCE IN LIBERIA**

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June 1998

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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established in 1990, a peace force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to help resolve the Liberian civil war. This force is considered as a model for future African peacekeeping forces, the idea of which has significantly evolved during the first half of the 1990s, and is supported by the international community. The effectiveness of such forces, based on the ECOMOG experience, is thought to be dependent on the availability of resources and on training.

This thesis discusses organization design and civil-military relations considerations to take into account when shaping future African peacekeeping forces. It makes recommendations toward improving effectiveness.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Regional settlement of African conflicts was a major concern of the Organization of African Unity at its creation in 1963. Its founders thought of two provisions for that purpose: the setup of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration as one of the four institutions of the OAU¹, and members' commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of conflicts.² Three decades after its creation, it appears that little success is attributed to OAU's efforts to resolve regional conflicts. For I. William Zartman, OAU's failures are the results of its excessive use of mediation as the main tool to resolve conflict, yet African mediators are hardly ready to play that role. In his view, mediators should be both communicators and formulators or manipulators. Formulators to overcome the inabilities of the opposed parties, manipulators to provide the parties attractive incentives to conflict reduction. That is, according to him, the latter component which is absent in African mediation:

African mediators have very limited resources for side-payments and relatively little clout in their threats to take sides or drop the mediation.³

Another explanation of the OAU's poor performances in conflict resolution is the dilemma in which it was permanently exposed after its creation. OAU was a product of a specific context. Its members, newly independent states in 1963, were more inclined to such value as territorial integrity and noninterference, than to imperatives of regional settlement of conflicts. The former was merely their first priority. That is why passivity and/or lack of coordination were common features of OAU's interventions in African conflicts. The outcomes of the OAU's

¹ The OAU Charter, Article 19.

² The OAU Charter, Article 3, par. 4.

³ Deng, Francis M. and Zartman, I. William, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1991, p. 313.

force in Chad in 1981 are illustrative of that conflict. Despite its presence, an effective cease-fire has never been obtained and parties kept on fighting until Hissen Habre's troops defeated their opponents and entered the capital city N'Jamena. OAU members remained divided on what course of action to take to impose cease-fire before that development. Smock and Gregorian describe OAU's failure in its first attempts to resolve African conflicts in these words:

The OAU should in many ways be the ideal body to resolve Africa's conflicts, but the OAU was not successful in two early instances of intervention, and its future involvements have consequently been limited. Many observers looked to the OAU to intervene in the Nigerian civil war to bring the war to an end. But by taking a strong stand against Biafra's secession, the OAU became too partisan to be an effective mediator. The OAU was caught in its perennial dilemma to promote peace in cases of civil war while at the same time condemning all secessionist movements and always supporting the government in power. These positions, although understandable, severely limited the peacemaking effectiveness of the OAU since its founding.

The OAU also failed to serve as an effective mediator in the Chad war in 1977. And, its sponsorship of a 1981 peacekeeping force in Chad in 1981-82 was short lived because of severe financial problems and a lack of commitment to conflict resolution on the part of the warring parties.⁴

If a negative assessment of OAU's overall actions toward settling African disputes may be argued, the failure of the few military interventions it has performed alone so far is certain, either for peacemaking or peacekeeping. Yet nowadays, the idea of "all African peacekeeping forces" is nurtured and has support from the United Nations and most western developed countries. One of the main reason why seems to be the performances of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force in Liberia, ECOWAS Monitoring Group

⁴ Smock, David R., *Making War and Waging Peace*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D. C., 1993, pp. 8-9.

(ECOMOG). Indeed it is the first complete model of African military intervention for conflict settlement in the continent. The term "complete" is used here in the sense that the intermediary objectives as well as the final goal assigned to the force were reached somehow, although discrepancies still exist between ECOWAS and the host country on how and when the force should withdraw.

ECOMOG's mandates in Liberia have changed throughout the years, from peace enforcement to peacekeeping and peace making, but all these mandates were accomplished under the same name. That is why the generic denomination of "peace force" is preferably used here. The question that arises is whether the West African peace force was effective in performing its peacekeeping mission in Liberia, to deserve the roles of asserting the ability of exclusive African forces to help solve African conflicts, and of providing the ideal shape for future peacekeeping forces. Surely its resource constraints and needs for technical training have been identified and today substantial efforts are being deployed throughout the world to prevent such experiences for future African forces. But it appears that those difficulties were not the only problems to solve in order to ensure full success to an "all African peace force". This thesis supports that assertion.

Its purpose is to identify the discrepancies in the organizational design of the West African force in Liberia, analyze the consequences on its effectiveness and on political developments in certain participating countries, and consequently make palliative recommendations.

The thesis addresses in its first chapter the environmental background of the idea of exclusive African peace forces, to the end of underling what is commonly thought as being the relevant requirements. The organization design of ECOMOG is presented in Chapter II, followed by its implications on the force's

effectiveness in Chapter III. The civil-military relations aspects are developed in Chapters IV, and a summary including palliative recommendations will conclude it.

II. ACTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF POTENTIAL AFRICAN PEACE FORCES

Since its creation in 1963, the Organization of African Unity's propensity to solve African conflicts by African states has never met the ideal conditions for independent, practical, and unbiased decisions to engage African forces in member countries. Africa, as other continents, was a battlefield of the Cold War and thus experienced the rivalry and the manipulations that characterized that period. Resource constraint was also an important component of its limitations. Today, not entirely, but a great part of these constraints are lessened and thereby offering better context to the idea of African peace forces. Added to that is the enthusiasm of the international community, fascinated by the assumed success performed by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG).

A. CHANGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

In the past two decades, movement toward democracy has been the general feature of political change, with the set of countries that Huntington has called the "Third Wave."⁵ Following that trend and the end of the Cold War, external threats have decreased for most countries throughout the world. Thus, new non-traditional missions are becoming more prevalent. Samuel Huntington has suggested in that context participation in international forces:

⁵ Huntington, Samuel, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992.

The end of the Cold War and the concomitant spread of democratizations means that many countries around the world face declining external security threat. Both new and old democracies must therefore redefine the role and missions of their military establishments. This poses a particular problem for the smaller new democracies, especially those in which the military has long played a role in internal as well in external security. Huntington suggests that international peacekeeping may be one viable alternative, as it is both close to the military traditional war fighting role and conducive to developing international relationships.⁶

The above path is largely explored today by the international community. The United States, the most powerful country in the world, has shifted its strategy from containment and deterrence to promoting democracy and economic advance worldwide, with a military component aimed to support creating and maintaining the stability required to allow democracy and economic growth to flourish. Following that change, the United States established a Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. The commission identified beside traditional peacekeeping operations, a spectrum of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). It called on in its recommendation for integration, and thus appropriate funding, of OOTW capabilities into overall the Department of Defense's mission planning⁷. The reality is that peace operations as other non-war operations are shifting from non-traditional missions to traditional ones.

As mentioned earlier, the Cold War significantly affected the OAU's functioning. Regions judged by both the United States and its allied and the Soviet Union to be strategically important were under their guidance in many

⁶ Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p. xiii.

matters, at least in security ones. In exchange those countries received an infusion of arms, technical assistance and financial aid, beside the traditional umbrellas that the superpowers could provide. In fact, East-West alignment of many African countries was prior to the founding of the OAU and a pattern of African states' voting at the United Nations General Assembly on important issues as observed by William J. Foltz in his attempts to illustrate the cleavage among African states, attests that.⁸ Foltz describes the limiting effects of that division on OAU's capability to solve African conflicts in these words:

The relevance of alignment to the OAU's ability to reduce conflict is that it calls forth automatic support for states on what appears at the time to be ideological grounds, whatever the merits of their international behavior may be and thus diminishes the gently coercive workings on a normative order. In this way, it reinforces alliance patterns based on patronage links between wealthier and poorer African states. Such rigidification is the antithesis of the way the OAU norms are supposed to work.⁹

With the end of the Cold War, the patronage of both the West and the East in the sense described above has withdrawn from the continent, giving birth to other forms of partnership between the only superpower, the United States and African countries. The key components of that new partnership include providing military training opportunities. The other Western Countries which indirectly participated in the previous West-East rivalry in Africa, now follow the

⁷ Report of The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, 1995, pp. 2-15_2-19.

⁸ Deng, Francis M. and Zartman, I. William, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1991, pp. 362-364.

⁹ Ibid.

same path as well. These developments constitute the basis of how the international community perceives the idea of “all African peace forces.”

B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S POSITION AND EMPHASIS

Regional settlement of conflict has in fact always been the preference of the United States. So was it for the OAU. Indeed, Article 52(2) of the United Nations Charter appeals to member states of both the UN and any regional organization to make every effort to settle local conflicts through that organization before referring them to the Security Council. Thus the “try OAU first before any other attempt” principle has been largely observed by African countries since the OAU’s creation, as William J. Foltz pointed it out:

The measure of the OAU’s assiduity in following out Article 52(2) is the fact that the first dispute wholly between independent members of the OAU to be brought by one of the disputants to the Security Council was Chad’s complaint against Libya in April 1983, at a time OAU itself was paralysed.¹⁰

However, OAU’s preferred tool was mediation for which it had very limited means and leeway. The United Nations could not ignore such limitations. For the United States, the reality of African peace forces to solve regional conflicts is both a “load-decrease” and a “dollar saving” opportunity, that means less intervention in Africa and less supplemental budgetary appropriations, all other things being equal. Indeed the United States have been a major player in most important African conflict resolutions, not only to protect its national interests and in participating in UN peacekeeping forces, but also in providing humanitarian

assistance when needed. The US interventions in Somalia in 1992, and, more recently in Liberia, from 1990 to 1996 are illustrative of that. Each of these interventions had a peculiar motive. In Somalia, it was for the humanitarian reason of facilitating the delivery of relief supplies. In Liberia the protection of US installations and citizens were the priorities, beside the evacuation of other foreign residents who wished to leave the country. Subsidies to support negotiations or other countries' interventions were also frequent in the Liberian case. The idea of settling conflicts by African peace forces is undoubtedly welcome by the United States, even though these forces would have to be substantially supported by it. The strategic and economic aspects of the creation of African peace forces are described by Chester A. Crocker in the following words:

The topic of peacekeeping in Africa is important in terms of U.S. values and national interests. The continent is wracked by violent conflict that imposes an intolerable human cost on African peoples and poses a severe challenge - if not an absolute roadblock, to the achievement of other U.S. goals in the region. Moreover, U.S. public funds available to support those other goals - development and market reforms, democracy and human rights - will be diverted into emergency relief operations, costly peace enforcement missions, and lengthy rehabilitation programs unless the dogs of war can be leashed.¹¹

The reasons suggested above are the basis of support and furthering of the idea of African peace forces. The United Nations General Assembly has

¹⁰ Deng, Francis M. and Zartman, I. William, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1991, p. 355.

¹¹ Smock, David R., *Making War and Waging Peace*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 263.

adopted in December 1997 a resolution by which it mandates the UN to help the OAU strengthen its capacity in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. The areas that the resolution specifies as to be covered by that assistance are: the establishment of an early warning system and its coordination with the UN's system; technical assistance; personnel training; and logistical and financial support. The United States have been backing up African peace initiatives since the creation in 1993 in Cairo, Egypt, of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Indeed, a supporting program, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (A.C.R.I.), with a strong training component, has been created for that purpose. The A.C.R.I. has been endorsed by the United Nations' peace body, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), thus is in perfect consistence with the UN's perceptions of the African states' initiatives. In 1997, the training component of A.C.R.I. was allocated \$15 million and provided training programs in selected African countries such as Senegal and Uganda. The other component of A.C.R.I., not less important, provides equipment to the African peace contingents.

European countries are also associated with these supporting programs establishing and maintaining African peace settlement capabilities. During a press conference held at the Pentagon on July 29, 1997, Ambassador Marshall Fletcher McCallie, President Clinton's special coordinator for A.C.R.I. declared:

While the United States has agreed to provide peacekeeping training with several of our African partners, we are also working closely with Great Britain and France to blend our initiatives into a common peacekeeping initiative. I hope this initiative will lead to

opportunities for joint training and joint exercises which will be based upon principles of building long-term capacity enhancement, legitimacy, openness and transparency.

In that move, a Franco-African joint military maneuver, whose purpose is peacekeeping skills training, in which besides France, Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau will be participating, is planned to be carried out in early 1998.

The overall picture of the international community's reaction to the initiative of African peace forces is a welcoming first, then a mobilization of resources to provide operational capabilities and substantial support to guarantee success to such important missions. Other words can hardly express that than Ambassador McCallie's ones when he stated during the press conference mentioned earlier, speaking about the U.S. trainers in Senegal and Uganda:

A.C.R.I. is a training initiative intended to work cooperatively with African states to create highly effective and rapidly deployable peacekeeping units which can operate together in either a humanitarian operation or in a standard peacekeeping operation. The U.S. emphasis will be to provide training with a common peacekeeping doctrine, based on international standards, and to provide common communications equipment which will enable trained units from any part of the African continent to work together in a peacekeeping operation.

The outputs of the West African force in Liberia (ECOMOG) are the basis of the idea of "African peace force," but also seem to guide the international community's position. Its performances in imposing a cease-fire between the rival groups, in enforcing peace, in disarming and demobilizing combatants, are

thought to be evidence of undeniable success. That explains exclusive concerns on operational capabilities and material support.

C. THE LIMITED SCOPE IN ASSESSING ECOMOG

The assessment of the West African peace forces in Liberia, merely on the basis of the cease-fire it imposed to the warring factions, allowing negotiations between their leaders, Ecowas and other players such as O.A.U. and UN, and on the basis of the holding of free elections, is at frontline of thoughts on improving African conflict resolution capabilities. That is apparent in many political speeches, as well as in several intellectual's works. Nigeria's president Sani Abacha, current ECOWAS chairman, declared in May 1997 during an interview in Lagos, Nigeria, that there were plans to transform the West African peace monitoring group in Liberia into a permanent peacekeeping force in the sub region after the planned election. He added up that ECOMOG had opened up new fields of cooperation and laid out what could evolve as a permanent peace force. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's address during the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Special Conference on Liberia, on October 1997, also suggests the same assessment. He stated in his opening speech the successful completion of the Liberian peace process. David R. Smock and Hrach Gregorian limit the "non success" of the West African force to the financial and military burdens in their 1993's book:

In August 1990, Ecowas sent between four thousand and five thousand troops to Liberia, to impose a cease-fire. Since separating the warring parties in November 1991, the West African force of about eight thousand has presided over an uneasy peace

while the sponsoring states continue to mediate among those in conflict. The effort has achieved some success, but the financial and military burden, particularly on Nigeria, is very heavy.¹²

It seems that the scopes of these assessments are too narrow. Indeed, when ECOMOG landed in Liberia in 1990, its first mandate was to impose a cease-fire. It did but not in an effective way. During its first intervention, ECOMOG limited its action to dislodging from Monrovia Charles Taylor's combatants, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (N.P.F.L.) which earlier attacked the Armed Forces of Liberia (A.F.L.) in the capital in an attempt to take over, thus ensuring control over Monrovia and the surrounding areas. It left over 90% of the territory to the N.P.F.L.. Furthermore, in October 1992, the N.P.L.F. attacked ECOMOG to free a supply ship en route to Charles Taylor's "territory." The ship had been previously arrested and kept in Monrovia's harbor following an ECOWAS embargo decision. The war which followed that attack was even bloodier than the one which opposed the West African force and the N.P.F.L. when the former tried to flush out of Monrovia Charles Taylor's troops in 1990. Yet in 1996, despite ECOMOG's control over Monrovia and the confined opposed faction groups in different areas of the city, the cease-fire was broken and the rival groups again fought each other in the core of the city. Furthermore fights beyond the ECOMOG controlled areas, (over 90% of the country), had really never ceased, until early 1996 when negotiations permitted the setup of an executive council in which all significant factions were represented.

¹² Smock, David R., *Making War and Waging Peace*, United States Institute of Peace Press,

The second aspect of how the scope of the assessments is limited relates to the duration of the mission. Effectiveness refers to adequate use of available resources to accomplish a mission. Thus time should be included in assessing effectiveness. It seems that in assessing the results of the West African force by its defenders, effectiveness in the sense defined by Random House dictionary is the only criterion agreed upon: Is effective what is adequate to accomplish a purpose, according to that dictionary. ECOMOG may be seen to have performed effectively. It imposed a cease-fire, although precarious, and allowed elections to be held. Effectiveness, in this case, is only concerned about evaluating the final result in comparison to the initial goal. Success depends on the width of the gap between the initial goal and the results. Peace operations are costly in terms of time, money, human lives, and political involvements. That is why factors such as the intensity ECOMOG operated to accomplish the mission, its length of peaceful operation and the political outcomes seem to be critical criteria for better assessment of the force. Under such considerations, rather than the criterion of "effectiveness" in the above sense, the basis for assessing ECOMOG would be "effectiveness" as Ivan S. Banki defines it:

Availability, capability, dependability, or performance that is directly related to optimum measure of the successful accomplishment of predetermined or adaptive individual, group, organizational or system objectives, requirements or standards.¹³

Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 9.

¹³ Banki, Ivan S., *Dictionary of Administration and Management*, Systems Research Institute, Los Angeles, California, 1986, p. 285.

Then what would be good measures associated with peace force effectiveness? The duration of the mission could not be ignored, although it is often determined by the resources needed and used. When Senegal joined ECOMOG in October, 1997, after the summit held by ECOWAS at Yamoussokro, Ivory Coast, during which the rival Liberian leaders agreed upon accepting the disarmament and cantonment of all combatants, these processes and the presidential election were supposed to end within six months. The reinforcements from Senegal were called upon and additional funds were provided by the United States to loosen the resource constraints and thus meet the April 1992 deadline. Despite that peace agreement and additional strength provided to the force, none of the above phases occurred as planned. The elections were held far later, in July 1997, five years after the expected deadline.

The political aspects also has been absent in the ECOMOG assessment because of the hidden links between how that force performed its mission and political developments in participating countries. Although those developments should not jeopardize the overall supposed success of the force, related lessons should be recorded as a reference point when shaping future African forces. Military coups, connected to the organizational design of ECOMOG, occurred in Gambia and Sierra Leone, the only countries under civilian regimes having permanent participation in the force since 1990. Peacekeeping and peacemaking operations are supposed to restore peace. Internal stability of single countries which depends in a large measure on what Huntington has

called “objective control of the military,” is a prerequisite for peace. Samuel Huntington uses “objective control of the military” to describe that civilian control which keeps the military out of the political arena:

The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere. Historically, the demand for objective control has come from the military profession, the demand for subjective control from the multifarious civilian groups anxious to maximize their power in military affairs.¹⁴

If solving a dispute in one country simultaneously causes military coups or political turmoils in others, one should wonder if intervening in the first conflict is opportune. The cost of such an intervention, thought in terms of barriers to democratization, and risks for new conflicts thus losses of human lives tend to be much higher cost in the long run, than the one of leaving the first conflict mature and die by itself. The actual political developments in Sierra Leone, where two other military coups occurred since then 1992 and where parts of ECOMOG are presently intervening to restore the last civilian regime overthrown in 1997, is illustrative of such a situation. The Sierra Leone’s special case will be presented in more detail in Chapter V.

Thus the idea of solving African conflicts with exclusive African military forces is evolving under favorable circumstances — never present before in any African attempt to handle regional conflicts. First, Africa is not nowadays a battlefield that it used to be during the Cold War. Secondly, efforts towards such

an idea are backed up by the international community, eager to get rid of the burden of complicated, frequent and expensive African conflict reductions when many other important challenges call on. Thirdly, the exaggeratedly positive assessment of the West African peace force in Liberia, based on the narrow scope of the holding of free presidential election in that country, makes the idea acceptable, although many other factors induced by the shaping of the force suggest additional considerations beside operational capabilities.

¹⁴ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 83-85.

III. THE ORGANIZATION DESIGN OF ECOMOG

The strength of the West African peace forces in Liberia has been variable throughout the years, sometimes reinforced to meet resource requirements, sometimes downsized following the withdrawal of participating countries due to shutdowns in the peace process. But its organization design has remained stable. Primarily composed of contingents from six countries — Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Gambia - the force was joined in October by 1,500-troop contingent from Senegal, which withdrew in early 1993. It was later reinforced by contingents coming from Benin and the Ivory Coast.

The organization design that is presented in this chapter is the one adopted from the beginning up to the end of the conflictive period — the period of negotiations toward the holding presidential elections. The number of units in the structure has sometimes changed of course according to the number of participating countries. The force in many regards resembled a simple structure organization, but presented to some extent features of a divisional organization. That means the organization structure was hybrid. The other components of the force's organization design relevant to this thesis, the reward system, suffered dramatically from that structure and were likely to jeopardize its performances. Indeed the Force Commander (F.C.) — a Nigerian Officer — could hardly have

the operational control of the overall force because of the logistic autonomy of the contingents and their bargaining power.

A. ECOMOGS'S STRUCTURE

Simple form and divisional organization both describe the way ECOMOG was structured. Contingents, composed of one or two battalions, were assigned sectors in Monrovia and surrounding areas depending on their size, where they had to provide security. That was done by controlling different checkpoints established for that purpose and by patrolling. Occasionally contingent's units were assigned specific tasks such as ensuring faction leader's security when they were confined in ECOMOG-controlled areas. The Force Commander at the head of the whole force was assisted by a very restricted multinational staff, comprising a Deputy Field Commander, a Chief of Staff, a Chief of Operations, a Chief of Logistics and a Chief Liaison Officer, some of them being heads of contingent. The centralized operational decision making process, the style of supervision, the size of the staff, the predominance of routine tasks and the very little standardization of behavior made this configuration resemble the simple structure. Referred to the dimensions that Henry Mintzberg identified in such a structure¹⁵, this resemblance is summarized in Table 1. Short comments are added to support our findings.

¹⁵ Gabarro, John J., *Managing People and Organizations*, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts, 1991, pp. 338 - 339.

ELEMENTS	DESCRIPTION	COMPLIANCE			
		Y	N	P or N.A.	COMMENTS
Key means of coordination	Direct supervision	x			Platoon was the smallest operating unit in the field
Key part of organization	Strategic Apex	x			The F.C. and his tiny staff constituted the strategic apex
STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS					
• Specialization of jobs	Little specialization	x			People were interchangeable
• Training and indoctrination	Little training and indoctrination	x			No training requirements. No training provided
• Formalization of behavior-bureaucratic/organic	Little formalization-organic	x			Almost no standard procedures
• Grouping	Usually functional			x	Contingents were asked to ensure their own logistic except for petroleum products
• Unit size	Wide	x			Wide at bottom
• Planning and control system	Little planning and control	x			Operations were difficult to plan and control due to the scarcity of resources
• Liaison devices	Few liaison devices	x			Basic radio communication devices
• Decentralization	Centralization	x			Operational decision making process very centralized at the F.C. level
SITUATIONAL ELEMENTS					
• Age and size	Typically young and small	x			Force setup at the end 1990 and deployed in Monrovia and nearby areas
• Technical System	Simple, not regulating	x			Basic routine peacekeeping. Tasks performed mainly with light weapons and simple equipment consisting of clearing people and cars and enforcing the curfew.
• Environment	Simple and dynamic, sometimes hostile		x		Complex and dynamic environment requiring a lot of flexibility
• Power	Chief executive control, often owner managed, not fashionable			x	Contingents were to some extent under the control of their own country home which provided for their needs

Table 1. Compliance With Mintzberg's Dimensions For Simple Structure.

The dominant features of the force were those of a simple structure organization, but the configuration presented certain aspects of the divisional form. The most apparent of them was that the contingents were directly provided food, weapons, ammunitions, medicine, uniforms, equipment and transportation means by their countries — they were expected to have logistical autonomy for those supplies. This situation is close to Mintzberg's view of such an organization structure:

Like the professional bureaucracy, the divisionalized form is not so much an integrated organization as a set of rather independent entities joined together by a loose administrative overlay.¹⁶

Accordingly, a key element described by Mintzberg in his review of the dimension of the five organization configurations¹⁷ was observed, beside two structural ones. Indeed, the battalion commanders — in fact the contingent's operational heads - played the role of middle line with a lot of bargaining power vis-à-vis the force headquarters. Because of their "so-called" logistical autonomy, they could decide which task to agree upon and which one to oppose under the pretext of logistical deficiency. The first structural element that characterizes a multidivisional form, in fact the one which enhanced the bargaining power of the battalion commanders, was the partial functional grouping of logistic resources. Only Petroleum Oil Lubricant (POL) products were managed at headquarters level for the whole force. They were supplied by Nigeria. As a result of how resources were provided to the units, the Force

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 342.

Commander could not have any other choice than decentralizing certain powers that traditionally are jealously preserved by military commanders. The battalion commanders for example had the initiative to decide how many people to deploy by checkpoints, how long the shifts had to be and which supplies had to be on hand. Combining the features described above, Exhibit 1 presents the organizational chart of the force from October 1991 to January 1993. It reflects the hybrid nature of the adopted configuration in the sense that operation and POL relations were controlled within the organization while other logistical relations were externally controlled.

B. THE REWARD SYSTEM

The second relevant component of the force's organization design — its reward system — was the compensation status which troops in the field were entitled to, in order to ensure the accomplishment of assigned tasks the desired way. Salary, of course, did not enter in this category, for being served home. It rather comprised various allowances such as basic allowances for subsistence, operational allowances or hazardous duty allowances. The force did not have a single reward system, rather each member country, provided such financial compensations to its contingent according to its own regulations. For sure, basic allowances for subsistence were provided to all contingents but the rates served per combatant awfully differed from each other. Special allowances were served only by certain participating countries. To fully realize how these compensations

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 338 - 339.

could affect the force's effectiveness, a review of the economic context in which they were served is in order.

1. The Providing Of Basic Allowances For Subsistence

As mentioned earlier, basic allowances for subsistence were separately provided by individual countries. Due to frequent shortages in the Liberian market, part of these funds were home base spent for non-perishable produces such as cereals, which were shipped to contingents. The balance in cash was sent to the field, either in U.S. dollars or in the local currency of the providing country. Three problems were identified in this process. The difference of rates of allowance adopted by contingents, the risk of change local subsistence expenses were exposed to, and the difficulty for contingents to get their supplies on time.


Very low income and heterogeneousness characterize ECOMOG participating countries' economies. Their Gross National Products (GNPs) per capita as of 1995, displayed in Table 2, is illustrative of that situation.¹⁸

The highest GNP per capita, which is Senegal's, is almost four times as much as the lowest and twice as much as the average. This predestinates enormous differences on the countries' abilities to support their contingent.

One may suggest that the data above, though illustrative of the countries' abilities to sustain substantial military expenditures, is silent about the importance of the armed forces. Thus a finer illustration would be a comparison

¹⁸ Source: World Development Report, The World Bank, 1996, Table 1, Basic Indicators, p. 188.

ECOMOG'S ORGANIZATION CHART



Dark Line: P.O.L. and Operational relations
 Light Line: Other Logistical Relations

Exhibit 1. ECOMOG'S Organization Chart As of 1992.

of annual military expenses per member of the armed forces. It is provided below for 1994.¹⁹

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>PNB PER CAPITA (in US \$)</u>
Nigeria	280
Ghana	410
Sierra Leone	160
Senegal	600
Guinea	520
Gambia	330
Mali	250

Table 2. Gross National Product of ECOMOG Participating Countries as of 1995.

Either set of data from Table 3 suggests very disproportionate levels of subsistence between various contingents, what affected the force's readiness in many ways that I will discuss further. The daily rates indeed varied from about two up to five U.S. dollars per person on average.

The risk of change to which contingents were exposed was merely the result of the diversity of the currencies of the participating countries and the cash money sent to contingents in the field.

¹⁹ Data computed from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995, pp. 42-43.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ARMED FORCES</u>	<u>ME/SOLDIER (in US \$)</u>
Nigeria	80000	4050
Ghana	7000	5857
Sierra Leone	13000	2769
Senegal	14000	4286
Guinea	12000	4167
Gambia	1000	14000
Mali	8000	4250

Table 3. Comparison of Annual Military Expense per Member of the Armed Forces in 1994

From 1991 to 1993, the seven participating countries had seven different local currencies, some convertible, others not at all. During the same period, the Liberian bank system, as anywhere where civil war is occurring, was paralyzed. Thus, sidewalk bank activities, reduced to exchange transactions, were handled by individuals. When funds were received by contingents, two scenarios could happen: either the currency was convertible, in which case the contingent could seek a reasonable rate of exchange based on the foreign exchange market, to get U.S. dollars, or it was not convertible, in that case arbitrary rates were imposed by sidewalk exchangers. The next step for a contingent was to convert a part of its funds into Liberian dollars. Indeed, some expenses could be executed in U.S. dollars, but others required Liberian dollars. In this process

also, the rate was very volatile. Before the civil war, one Liberian dollar, administratively governed, was worth one U.S. dollar. At the beginning of 1992, it was worth 1/8th U.S. dollar and at the end of 1992, 1/35th U. S. dollar. This is to say the Liberian dollar had lost 97% of its U.S. dollar value at the end of 1992 due to the civil war. There was a continual war caused devaluation of the Liberian dollar and consequently a permanent up and down price dance one could hardly predict. Thus the contingent's purchasing power was also permanently altered. It is known that traditional macroeconomy theories establish a rise of price in case of devaluation as Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro recalls in his book:

In most of the theoretical literature on devaluation, it has been assumed that a devaluation will increase the domestic prices of importables and exportables not only relative to other prices in the economy but also in absolute amounts. Indeed, this is the fundamental mechanism that triggers off the first effect of devaluation. Thus, a price index that includes importable and exportable commodities as well as nontraded goods is bound to show an increase.²⁰

But in a normal economy there is an array of anti-inflationary policies, of which the more commonly used is open-marked operations, that would help market forces act to stabilize prices. In the Liberian case, as it is likely in any other country under war, these instruments merely are not workable. The idea is that the situation did not allow the contingents to ensure a stable level of

²⁰ Alejandro, Carlos F. Diaz, *Exchange-Rate Devaluation in a Semi-Industrialized Country*, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1965, p. 14.

subsistence, very few possibilities of substitute products being available in the marketplace.

Nonperishable supplies ordered by contingents were received from their home countries in a haphazard way. Liberia obviously was to some extent isolated from the rest of the world during ECOMOG's operations. No air or sea freight carriers dared to do business in the area, and the passenger airlines and ships which provided services to Monrovia destinations were very few and rarely on schedule. During the period 1991 - 1993, one civilian ship, "Ile de Carabane 2", provided the Dakar-Conakry-Freetown-Monrovia route. Two airlines, Air-Guinea and Air-Ivoire, operated respectively on the Conakry-Monrovia and Abidjan-Monrovia routes. This situation was the result of the fragility of the cease-fire. Indeed, during negotiations between ECOWAS and the warring factions' leaders, all combatants still had their weapons and ammunitions. Thus, doing business in such circumstances presented a too high risk. This is to say that only light supplies could be received by civilian means, and if it was the case, deliveries were haphazard. The alternative of military carriers was not available to all contingents. Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal were the only countries possessing military ships, large enough to carry supplies that economically justified their operations. Let us recall that Mali does not have a navy. This was not really an issue since that country had only two observers in the field. But I wonder what Mali's choice would have been if it has to supply 1000 people in Monrovia. The development above suggests that at least three

contingents out of seven — Sierra Leone's, Guinea's and Gambia's, were unable to estimate the lead time for their supplies and therefore, little room to maneuver was available for ECOMOG's headquarters to plan operations including all contingents. An illustrative example of that limitation is that when ECOMOG and the warring factions' leaders agreed to start the deployment and disarmament process in 1992, the Senegalese contingent was the only one capable of deploying its troops with at least 15 days food supplies on hand to Lofa County, located 200 miles away from Monrovia. Nigeria and Ghana with a little less autonomy in terms of ration-days could deploy to no more than 100 miles away, and Sierra Leone and Guinea had to stay in Monrovia due to the low level of their reserves and the risk that their supplies would not arrive in time during the operations.

In sum, several factors related to the subsistence jeopardized the contingent's readiness and therefore the operational capabilities in the field. That is one of the reason the mission lasted so long.

2. The Providing Of Operational-Related Allowances

In this area too, regimes adopted by countries were disparate. The purpose of this type of allowance is to provide troops in operations with a sort of reparation for being both constrained away from their station and exposed to hazardous circumstances. It appears under different denominations, but serving the same purpose. Sometimes it is called operational allowance, sometimes special allowance for hazardous duties. Its key importance from a beneficiary's

standpoint, is that it is distributed in the field and provides purchasing power for basic needs. It is therefore a key component of what drives the morale of the troops in the field. The differences in its allocation by different countries participating in ECOMOG resided in both the philosophy of these allowances and the rate adopted. Indeed, opposition between two military traditions was observed: one which assumes the equality of all human lives in such a circumstance and therefore appeals a unique rate of allowance for all troops, and one which favors differences of merits thus suggesting different rates for each category of military personnel. Nigeria took the lead of the first tradition. Its troops were uniformly served, as those of the countries which followed that lead, the equivalent of five U.S. dollars per person per day. Senegal, Mali and Guinea — in fact the francophone countries, adopted rates varying from the equivalent of three U. S. dollars per day for enlisted, up to ten U.S. dollars per day for officers. These differences were not without giving rise to jealousy among contingents, what was harmful to the overall morale and cohesion of the force.

Thus the structure of ECOMOG was both bicephalous and hybrid. Its means were substantially controlled by individual countries, which considerably restricted its operational control by the Force Commander through his inability to adapt resources to requirements in the field and the bargaining power of the battalions' Commanders. Of course, other serious consequences not relevant to this thesis, fall from that structure. Let us think about complications on legal

aspects of traffic accidents involving for example Senegalese vehicles, and in which a Liberian citizen is injured or killed. The force's reward system was characterized by substantial differences between regimes adopted by participating countries, in allocating both subsistence and operation-related allowances to their contingents. As a result, different levels of operational readiness were observed among the contingents at any given time. These features of the force's organization design having been presented, it is in order to analyze the consequences on the force effectiveness.

IV. CONSEQUENCES ON THE FORCE EFFECTIVENESS

A peacekeeping force is an organization created to accomplish a mission at a given period of time. As such, its organization design is one of the key factors that should allow it to have its members perform their job, in order to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission. However, unlike most organizations whose mandates are clear, stable, and the enemies identified, a peacekeeping force is characterized by varying mandates as the situation in which it operates changes, as peace making efforts produces outcomes, and by the nonexistence of defined enemies. Indeed, most organizations operate in a competitive environment where imperatives of producing better outputs, of gaining advantages over other competitors and satisfying key stakeholders stand. Peacekeeping forces are rather unique in producing a given output, have to equally satisfy the opposed parties in a conflict, and operate in a very volatile environment. A peacekeeping force is also a mix of unknown resources when it is an international force. These two characteristics are the basis of what a peace force needs in order to be effective. The consequences of ECOMOG's organization design on the force effectiveness need to be examined at two levels of analysis: 1) ECOMOG as an organization seeking to fit its components to each other and to fit its external environment; 2) ECOMOG as a coalition of forces with different backgrounds, different values and different practices.

A. DESIGNING FOR ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS

Organization effectiveness is the subject of many recent writings. Most of them emphasize the importance of organization design as a key element for effectiveness, and deny the additional characteristic of organizations thought of as sets of parts put together. Indeed, organization design and direct contact are identified to be the means by which leaders influence subordinates to have them perform their jobs in a direction set by organizations. However, since ensuring continuous contact between leaders and subordinates at all levels of the hierarchy is expensive in terms of time and resources, organization design - the structure of the organization, its rewards, its measurement and recruiting system - is the most suitable tool for effectiveness. Scholars also emphasize the necessity of consistency when designing for effectiveness. Some refer to it as "fit." In other words, parts and systems of organizations should fit each other in order to ensure that inputs as well as outputs do not interfere, and the organization as a whole should be tailored to fit the external environment in which it operates. It also might be described as an interrelatedness of an organization to its external environment. Henry Mintzberg put it in these words, commenting on devastating results that followed examples of organizational changes:

These incidents suggest that a great many problems in organizational design stem from the assumption that organizations are all alike; mere collection of components parts to which elements of structure can be added and deleted at will, a sort of organizational bazaar.

The opposite assumption is that effective organizations achieve coherence among their component parts, that they do not change one element without considering the consequences to all of the others. Spans of control, degrees of job enlargement, forms of decentralization, planning systems, and matrix structure should not be picked and chosen at random. Rather, they should be selected according to internally consistent groupings. And these groupings should be consistent with the situation of the organization - its age and size, the conditions of the industry in which it operates, and its production technology.²²

Jay W. Lorsch said virtually the same thing when assimilating designing with framing to influence employees, establishing networks of collaboration and minimizing costs:

Managers are concerned with three related goals when they make design decisions:

1. To create an organization design that provides a permanent setting in which managers can influence individuals to do their particular jobs.
2. To achieve a pattern of collaborative effort among individual employees, which is necessary for successful operations.
3. To create an organization that is cost effective — one that achieves the first two goals with a minimum of duplication of effort, payroll costs, and so on.²³

These requirements apply to any type of organizations seeking effectiveness, profit as non-profit organizations depending on the business in which they operate. It is not doubtful that they are more flexible for an organization such as a public library which operates in a stable environment than

²² Henry Mintzberg, *Managing People and Organizations*, Harvard Business School Publications, Boston, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 332.

²³ Jay W. Lorsch, *Managing People and Organizations*, Harvard Business School Publications, Boston, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 314.

for one operating in a less stable environment such as a corporation producing commodities. It is not less true that situations in which the organization is constantly monitored, assessed, criticized, and exposed to manipulations (this is the case of international bodies in general) make them particularly important.

Inconsistency is apparent in ECOMOG's design. First, one of its mandates well known in advance had to be interposing between warring factions in order to facilitate negotiations under the auspices of ECOWAS. Surely a guarantee of successful accomplishment of such a mandate depends in a large measure on the rival factions' perceptions of neutrality of the force. Although many scholars and experts have differently defined "peacekeeping," a common aspect of these definitions is the purpose of maintaining peace and security by specific means and neutrality of the executors. At the UN level it is defined as follows:

As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the "enforcement action" of the United Nations under Article 42.²⁴

Neutrality is the first organizational requirement for the effectiveness of a peacekeeping force. Indeed, unlike most organizations seeking to destroy their

²⁴ N. D. White, *Keeping the Peace*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1993, p. 183.

enemies, well identified, to accomplish their missions, peacekeeping forces should carry out theirs objectively, and without providing any support to either party in the conflict, in order to be constantly accepted. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, former UN Secretary General pointed that out in these words:

In fact, it (peacekeeping) is in many ways a reversal of the use of military personnel foreseen in the Charter. It has been developed for situations where there is no formal determination of aggression. Its practitioners have no enemies, are not there to win, and can use force only in self-defense. Its effectiveness depends on voluntary co-operation.²⁵

ECOMOG operations, with two participating countries sharing borders with Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria whose government had privileged relations with Samuel Doe's regime before the coup attempt, therefore could hardly satisfy that condition. As a result, the peace process later on met with a series of stalemates. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (N.P.F.L.) soon accused Nigeria, Guinea and Sierra Leone of being partial and subjected the endorsement of the cantonment and the disarmament of combatants agreement to enlargement of the force to other likely more neutral countries. Its motive was to counterbalance the alleged partiality of those participating countries.

Another inconsistency aspect that ECOMOG's design revealed is related to its functional groupings. Indeed, as described before, it provided very little flexibility to the force, yet flexibility is surely a factor of effectiveness in peacekeeping as Bennett stressed it:

²⁵ United Nations, The Blue Helmets, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1985, p. v.

To the extent that disputes have on occasion been dealt with effectively, the factor of flexibility has made a major contribution.²⁶

Indeed, peace forces should be flexible given the uncertainties in which they operate, uncertainty about how they will be treated by parties, uncertainty about what the outcomes of the peacemaking process will be and about its future mandates. Although a peacekeeping force is a pacific means toward conflict reduction and peacekeepers should not use their weapons except in self-defense, the worst of results has to be foreseen. Peacekeepers are permanently exposed to risk of physical attacks by parties in case of stalemates in the peace process, or merely by uncontrolled elements willing to jeopardize it. When peacekeepers are deployed on the ground following a cease-fire, on the outcomes of negotiations between parties and the force's sponsor, namely the peacemaking process, depend this risk and further missions the force will have to carry out. The United Nations has lost hundreds of peacekeepers since its creation, as a result of either clashes between parties and peacekeeping units, or deliberate sabotage by independent uncontrolled elements. This suggests that peacekeeping units must have a flexibility allowing them to shift quickly from pacific peace units to combat ones, in order to be able to defend themselves, when necessary, and restore order. Such flexibility also facilitates the shifting from one mandate to another one, when directed by the organization under the authority of which the force operates

²⁶ A. LeRoy Bennett, *International Organizations, Principles and Issues*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1995, p. 109.

Several mandates were assigned to ECOMOG during its operations in Liberia. In 1989, the first mandate was to impose cease-fire by flushing out of Monrovia N.P.F.L.'s units, identified as the aggressor. ECOMOG executed that mandate successfully. The second one was to monitor the cease-fire while negotiations for the cantonment and disarmament of all combatants were taking place. It included the implementation of embargo measures as well. Later on, the mandate was to help organize and supervise the presidential elections. It is obvious that each of the mandates described above required specific organizational traits, such: as the size of sectors assigned to different units, the size of the basic operating task force, the operating procedures, the equipment on hand, the decision making process, the flow of information and so on. During the execution of these mandates, many clashes involving ECOMOG's troops occurred. A few cases are presented here. ECOMOG's soldiers were held hostage for unknown reasons by N.P.F.L. units, then either killed or beaten, soon after the second mandate started in 1992. ECOMOG's units were also attacked by N.P.F.L. units in October 1992 when ECOMOG, observing embargo measures directed by ECOWAS, stopped a ship believed to be carrying weapons to be delivered to N.P.F.L. units. During these incidents, ECOMOG's capabilities to react quickly were limited. No action followed the holding of hostages, and several days passed before the Field Commander could get in touch with the N.P.F.L.'s leader. Unfortunately at that time they were already killed. When N.P.F.L. units attacked ECOMOG, urgent reinforcements in troops,

weapons and ammunitions were called for from Lagos, Accra and Dakar, to prevent them from entering Monrovia. These two examples illustrate that ECOMOG was not prepared to adapt and react quickly to such circumstances. The rigidity of its structure and the fact that individual countries controlled most of its resources were possible causes of that situation.

B. THE COALITION FORCE'S EFFECTIVENESS

Peacekeeping forces resemble in some aspects collective security organizations, for they all are coalitions of different militaries, with different values, different technologies, different languages and practices, put together to accomplish simultaneously common missions. Surely collective security organizations, intended to last longer, tend to have doctrine and therefore to be more radical in integrating units. However, both organizations deal with the same difficulty: of operating under the same command structure and for the same mission contingents, each with different backgrounds in an attempt to provide a unified front. If time is available to plan a coalition force, among the areas integration efforts have to focus on, are competency, training, intelligence, logistics, communications and language. Martha Maurer put it in the following words:

Effective execution requires that all functional elements such as operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other support activities, do their part and support the operational requirements. Each is important to the whole operation.²⁷

²⁷ Martha Maurer, *Coalition, Command and Control*, National Defense University, Harvard University, 1994, pp. 84-85.

The circumstances in which the ECOMOG was created did not permit significant efforts in all these areas before the start of the peacekeeping operation, but its organization design had to support integration efforts in such areas as: language, training, competency of people, and intelligence. Language was an advantage of ECOMOG's effectiveness, since the organization only comprised of a few contingents during the length of the whole operation. Indeed, unlike the many different languages in UN peacekeeping operations in the past — on average 17 different ones from 1948 - 1996²⁸ — only anglophone and francophone countries participated in ECOMOG, and some of them who share borders have some dialects spoken in both sides. The fact that Liberia is an anglophone country, and that some Liberian ethnic groups speak the same dialect as ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and Guinea was positive as well. To the extent that it is to enhance interoperability — the ability to provide or receive services from other contingents, ECOMOG has an advantage in the area of training, since all contingents had very simple and basic technology equipment and weapons.

Competency of people working at the staff level is a key factor of effectiveness for a coalition, a factor that the worry of representation should not jeopardize. The imperative to have the right people at the right position has to predominate the willingness of ensuring each participating country a position in

²⁸ UN, The Blue Helmets, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, pp. 691 - 776.

the staff. In fact these two conditions are not exclusive and representation can significantly enhance the force's effectiveness as Martha Maurer put it:

In determining the composition of both the operational staff and the long term planning staff, people with experience in the relevant countries are invaluable, as is openness to new ideas.²⁹

ECOMOG's organization design was short of considerations for experience and competency. Throughout the life of the force, Nigeria was almost constantly assigned the key staff positions of Force Commander, Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations, Chief of Logistics, Intelligence Chief Officer and Communication Chief Officer, while the other billets were earmarked for all other participating countries. Since most of the countries relieved their contingents every six months, it was frequent that senior officers with suitable backgrounds, war colleges or defense university graduates, with substantial experience in field operations, were assigned to none or very subsidiary positions. Since all contingents were anyway represented in the staff and competent senior officers frequently were either unemployed or not adequately employed, representation was preeminent over any other considerations. This was to affect considerably the force's effectiveness and was the cause of most of ECOMOG's failures and mistakes. When ECOMOG was attacked by N.P.F.L. units in 1992, it called for other previously disarmed factions' help, provided them with weapons and ammunitions to ensure its defense. Those who made such a decision did not certainly know that not only were they jeopardizing the peace process, but also

were violating international law. At the best, that was not consistent with the United Nation's Charter. I attribute such a decision to incompetencies within the ECOMOG's staff.

Intelligence was another weakness for ECOMOG. Each contingent had its own intelligence information in addition to ECOMOG headquarters', which was Nigerian, and no link existed between these different systems. Differences of values, perceptions and experiences of militaries participating in a coalition force make the integration of intelligence information critical to its effectiveness. Information, which is important and urgent for a contingent, may seem banal and ordinary for another one because of the differences mentioned above. Fragmenting information is likely to lead to errors as Martha Maurer put it:

However, difference in information, perspectives, and time lags can cause misperception even when both parties have complete common interest, when no deception is intended or suspected, and when both parties are trying to communicate accurately.³⁰

Reduction of the differences of interpretation as well as of information in order to minimize errors in making decisions and in operating, through integration, is a high priority requirement for a peace force's effectiveness. David S. Alberts and Richard Hayes emphasized that:

Thinking about alternatives available to the enemies of peace and finding ways to structure the situation so that their interest and actions coincide with those seeking peace become very important. This can be as simple as ensuring observation, documentation, and media attention when peace terms are likely to be violated, or

²⁹ Martha E. Maurer, *Coalition, Command and Control Key Considerations*, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 68.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 62.

as complex as creating incentives for cooperation between groups with very different world views.³¹

The killing of Guinean peacekeepers by N.P.F.L. elements in 1992 would not have occurred if intelligence information were shared within ECOMOG. Guinean elements welcomed during fighting between the ECOMOG and the N.P.F.L. those elements that fired on them and fled away. They could not identify them, because they were disguised in ECOMOG soldiers with uniforms stolen from Nigerian soldiers, previously held as hostages by that faction. Of course, if this latter information were available to the Guinean contingent, more caution would have been observed to avoid such a tragedy.

Thus, as depicted in Exhibit 2, despite the advantages of comprising a few contingents using, only two very close working languages, of almost not encountering problems to ensure interoperability between its members, ECOMOG was far from being an effective peace force. Lack of consistency characterized it, through the choice of participating countries as well as through its "quasi rectangular" structure, with substantial disconnection between its operational grouping and its logistical supports. Differences between the reward systems of contingents also had jeopardized its flexibility and its ability to adjust to operational requirements and changes, essential to a peacekeeping force. The weakness of integration efforts in such a key success area as intelligence, added to the blind willingness to favor representation instead of competency in

³¹ David S. Alberts and Richard Hayes, *Command Arrangements for Peace Operations*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, National Defense University Press,

appointing people, explain many of its failures during the peace process. Undoubtedly, some of ECOMOG's problems have been identified such as the lack of competency, and efforts are presently implemented to solve them. The African Crisis Response fits in this framework, at least for providing troops with basic peacekeeping skills, like how to check safely vehicles and individuals. However, the structural causes of problems need to be diagnosed and neutralized. Training people is one thing, putting them where they can perform what is needed from them, is another.

ECOMOG'S TEST OF EFFECTIVENESS

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS	ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS	ASSESSMENT		NOTES
		FAV	UNFAV	
ORGANIZATION	STRUCTURE		U	
	REWARD		U	
	NEUTRALITY		U	
	FLEXIBILITY		U	
PEACE FORCE	LANGUAGE	F		2 vs 17 for UN in 48
	LOGISTICS		U	
	COMMUNICATION		U	
	INTELLIGENCE		U	
COALITION FORCE	TRAINING		U	
	INTEROPERABILITY	F		

F: Favorable
U: Unfavorable

Exhibit 2. ECOMOG's Test of Effectiveness

V. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS OUTCOMES OF ECOMOG

ECOMOG was created at the end of the last decade; a period during which movement toward democracy was observed almost everywhere throughout the world. In West Africa, it was very apparent. The subregion which has been in the past home to many military coups or at least attempts of coup, presented signs of political stability and improved civil-military relations. Then ECOMOG was born, and many political events have happened since then, in not all but in most of the participating countries, surely as outcomes of how the force was organized. Obviously, establishing a link between those political developments and ECOMOG's organization design is not easy. However, I would certainly be convincing in asserting that, by examining the state of civil-military relations in the participating countries prior to the force, the events that occurred in detail and the main actors in those events and their motives,

A. ASSESSING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AS OF THE MID 1980s

It is admitted by scholars that good civil-military relations means effective civilian control of the military, that state of civil-military relations which keeps the military out of politics, and offers at the same time a framework for its professional development. That is what is observed in most western developed countries such as the United States, France and Germany, not at all in many African countries, where the militaries took power soon after independence, either to relieve the outgoing colonial powers or to overthrow the first civilian

regimes for various motives. Africa is cited among the parts of the world where most military coups occurred as Claude Welch pointed out:

My own list of successful coups d'état in Africa, in the 1958-86 period, includes nearly 70 seizures of power and to this list could be added an even larger number of unsuccessful coups, insurgencies and rebellions.³²

West Africa unfortunately is at the top of the list, with 24 coups from 1963 to 1985. Undoubtedly, the absence of military coups represents an acceptable gauge of whether there is effective civilian control of the military in Africa, so do voluntary withdrawals of militaries from power. They both illustrate acceptance of military submission to civilian rule. These two features were generally observed in ECOMOG participating military-ruled countries, from 1985 to 1991. In 1991, for the first time since independence, no military coup had occurred in West Africa for six years.

In Nigeria where five military coups happened in 20 years, from 1965 to 1985, General Babangida's regime survived the second half of the 1980s. The military regime also engaged in political reforms toward democracy, under the recommendations of a body newly created in 1986 for that purpose — The Political Bureau. The elections, which were supposed to follow this process, although promised, did not take place but the premise of military withdrawal was in the air. No military coup occurred in any other ECOMOG participating country during the same period. Rather, a pattern of disguised military withdrawal was observed. In Guinea, soon after taking over, General Conté accepted the principle of transfer of power to elected civilians. He then appointed a committee

to draft a new constitution. That constitution endorsed by 98.7% in a referendum, led later on to presidential elections that General Conté won under the sponsorship of the "Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès (P.P.P.)." The Ghana case was also quite similar. Captain Rawling created in 1981 a National Commission for Democracy (N.C.D.), which after being assigned in 1983 the task of the district electoral process, was charged with drafting a new constitution for the return to democracy and political pluralism. Presidential elections were held in 1993 and Rawling was victorious. In Sierra Leone, General Momoh soon realized the need for political change and decided to hold elections in 1996-one year ahead of schedule. He won too. In Mali, presidential elections did not take place, but General Traore soon ruled in 1979 through a newly created party, the "Union Democratique du Peuple Malien." Failures to stretch the political platform and to hold elections surely are the causes of what happened in this country later in 1991. Senegal and Gambia, the last two participating countries have never been under military rule.

The above mentioned developments suggest that the military regimes were pulling out of politics in ECOMOG participating countries, and that the recipe was "take off the uniform and legitimize your power through elections." To the questions why military coups happened in African countries, answers provided by scholars are varied, but overlapping in certain areas does exist. For O'Kane, military coups in general terms are political instabilities involving use of force which are motivated by dissatisfaction:

³² Claude E. Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms?*, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1987. p. 2.

They (coups) all represent a breakdown of some dimension in legitimate political order and also the presence of 'collective frustration and aggression' among the population.³³

Bienen perceives military interventions in Africa, including coups as motivated by a variety of factors, among them military disputes about resources allocated to them:

The motives for military takeover continue: personal and corporate grievances; civilian pressures for the military to intervene; fear that someone else will act or that countermilitaries will be created such as general service units, personal bodyguard units, militarized police forces; economic problems that force curtailment of defense spending and military privileges; general ethnic tensions that spill over into the armed forces; internal factionalism or dissolution of central authority with the armed forces, leading factions to think they must control the state in order to control the military.³⁴

Welch in his book "No Farewell to Arms" argues for economic motives to explain military involvement into politics in the Third World:

The clustering of military-dominated governments in the Third World has also produced a spate of arguments linking the political role of officers with restricted levels of economic development. The lower the GNP (Gross National Product) per capita, it seems, the greater the chance of military "intervention." Consequently, if and when industrialization occurs, "civilian control" and a non-political form of professionalism might become more likely.³⁵

The three explanations above have a common factor, the dissatisfaction of economic needs. Surely that explains several past military coups in those countries, but it is not less sure that a cause to effect relationship doesn't exist between military coup and persistence of bad economic conditions. Indeed if

³³ Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups*, Avebury, Brookfield USA, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 1987, p. 2.

³⁴ Henry S. Bienen, *Armed Forces, Conflict and Change in Africa*, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco and London, 1989, p. 40.

³⁵ Claude E. Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms?*, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1987, p. 2.

that was the case, the absence of military coups would be the result of good economic performances and satisfaction of economic needs. And military interventions would have increased in the mid 1980s, given the economic conditions of the set of countries, as illustrated in Table 4.

Thus the economic argument does not explain the absence in the mid 1980's of military interventions in ECOMOG participating countries. One might think of the general democratic move that Huntington has called the Third Wave, to explain both the absence of coups and the military withdrawal from politics.

COUNTRY	YEAR						
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
NIGERIA	394	420	395	360	390	405	412
GHANA	270	273	273	277	285	292	294
SENEGAL	457	460	468	472	482	469	472
SIERRA LEONE	205	189	182	188	189	188	175
MALI	178	173	188	199	195	214	210
GUINEA	265	264	447	454	467	469	462
GAMBIA	363	364	351	361	375	384	391

Table 4. 1984 - 1990 Country's GNP Per Capita in Constant 1994 Dollars.³⁶

For Huntington, not only one factor explains democratization in one country, but a mix of some of the general causes that he identified, declining legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, economic development and economic crises, religious changes, new policies of external actors and demonstration effects, with

³⁶ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 53-102.

other factors specific to any given country.³⁷ Religious factors do not seem to be relevant to the analysis, since no significant evolution in that area has occurred in West Africa during the last decade. The economic argument also has been explored to a certain extent that has proven not applicable to the set of countries. But whether the other Huntington's general theoretical causes apply deserves examination. Declining military legitimacy could be thought of as a motive for the 1980's withdrawal from politics in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria, given the pattern of withdrawal or intended withdrawal I have described above — "drop the uniform and run for election." Indeed, military coups that happened in Africa had very wide public support due to the circumstances in which they were perpetrated, or the social events that they followed, such as demonstrations, general strikes, upheavals, economic disasters, oppression and corruption. Therefore, to the people, perpetrators had initial legitimacy by the only fact of removing previous leaders. However, that legitimacy had to be consolidated through promises to solve problems that led to the coups. Better conditions of life have always been and will always be among those promises. As the community realized either the status quo or the worsening of its welfare, legitimacy of perpetrators was eroded and change were sought. Sundhaussen described that process in the following words:

Military regimes - immediately after toppling a civilian government - normally do not face a legitimacy crisis. (Even the notorious Idi Amin, when seizing power, could count on the enthusiastic support of large sections of the Ugandan community). A tolerant public is usually willing to wait to determine whether the promises of problem

³⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press: Norman and London, 1991, pp. 31-108.

solving, made almost ritually by an incoming regime, will indeed be fulfilled. But this tolerance or even support is generally short-lived.³⁸

Thus the 1980's disillusionment of the messianic role of the militaries in Africa supports the motive of declining legitimacy, for explaining the absence of military coups, potential perpetrators perceiving those events as warnings. Huntington's second cause of democratization, the new policies of external actors is also consistent with the observed military withdrawals in West Africa. Indeed the movements toward democracy, with the end of the bipolar international political system that the WEST and the EAST have been animating for four decades, has been largely backed up by powers, at the first rank of which the United States. Let us recall the shift of the United States' strategy from containment and deterrence to promoting democracy and economic advance worldwide. Huntington stressed that in these words:

External actors significantly helped third wave democratizations. Indeed, by the late 1980's the major sources of power and influence in the world — the Vatican, the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union — were actively promoting liberalization and democratization.³⁹

African states which previously were, as all other countries were, stakes for the two Cold War competitors, the United States and the Soviet Union, suddenly became freed from pressure in the 1980s, and rather entered new international norms, which guaranteed them substantial rewards in exchange for democratization. They largely accepted the offer.

³⁸ ULF Sundhaussen, *Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility, Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Summer 1984, p. 545.

The last general cause of the third wave democratizations that Huntington defends and which is relevant to this thesis, is the demonstration effect or snowballing. His idea is that many Third Wave democratizations have occurred or occur in countries, as a result of propensity to imitate countries where successes were observed following democratizations:

Successful democratization occurs in one country and this encourages democratization in other countries, either because they seem to face similar problems, or because successful democratization elsewhere suggests that democratization might be a cure for their problems whatever those problems are, or because the country that has democratized is powerful and/or is viewed as a political and cultural model.⁴⁰

This phenomenon seems to have contributed to the 1980s military withdrawals in West Africa, first because a pattern of withdrawal has been largely observed: revision of the constitution following a draft proposed by an independent committee and approved by referendum, and then elections. Second, these withdrawals have occurred during a relatively short period of time. But snowballing hardly resisted the political evolution of the early 1990s in some of the set of ECOMOG participating countries where deterioration of civil-military relations occurred when movement toward democracy was still making invaluable progress anywhere else in the world.

B. THE 1990s' REVERSAL

The analysis of civil-military relations changes in the set of ECOMOG participating countries, as outcomes of the force, should exclude two countries:

³⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press: Norman and London, 1991, p. 86.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

Senegal and Mali. Indeed these two countries represented deviations from the other countries' model of participation. Senegal joined ECOMOG in late 1991, during the "true peacemaking" process, when one of the conflicting parties, the N.P.F.L., required its presence to guarantee the neutrality of the force, as a prerequisite for the endorsement of the cantonment and disarmament accords. The joining of Senegalese troops for that purpose was sponsored by the United States, which provided the Senegalese contingent with substantial financial resources and equipment as well, including weapons, ammunitions, vehicles, medical supplies and uniforms. Mali's participation was limited to two military observers. Thus, these two countries did not face the same constraints to support their contingents as the others.

Let us examine now what political events happened in the set of ECOMOG participating countries, Senegal and Mali excluded, during the West African force's operations, the circumstances in which they occurred and also the key players in those events.

In April 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser, a former ECOMOG officer in charge of logistics in Sierra Leone's contingent, led a coup to overthrow President Momoh's regime, when his country was facing two challenges, sustain a war against a rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front, and support adequately its ECOMOG contingent. One of the motives of the coup was clearly announced by the perpetrators, when broadcasting grievances about the conditions in which the troops operated in both Liberia and Sierra Leone: the lack of resources. A few years later, the Chief of the Sierra Leone Defense staff,

Captain Maada Bio, overthrew Strasser's regime in January 1996 and decided to organize elections for the return to civilian power. They were held in March 1996 but Ahmed Tejan Kabbah who won them did not stay long in power, for being deposed in May 1997 by another officer, Major Johnny Koromah. ECOMOG whose mandate was supposed to end in February 1998, shifted to Sierra Leone under a mandate of ECOWAS, to restore Kabbah's authority, and is still there struggling for the fulfillment of that new mandate.

In July 1994 in Gambia, a group of ECOMOG soldiers led by Lieutenant Yayah Jammeh, engaged in a demonstration to claim payment of special ECOMOG operational allowances, soon after they came back home. That demonstration ended with the overthrow of President Daouda Jawara's regime.

In Nigeria also, there has been a return to military rule in November 1993, but it was not a result of a military coup. General Sani Abacha, previously Vice President, ascended to power following President Shonekan's resignation.

In Conakry, in February 1996, military elements attempted to overthrow President Lansana Conté's regime, taking advantage of protests by soldiers for increased pay and allowances. That would have led to a chaotic situation if President Conté did not make concession, including a doubling of salaries and immunity from prosecution for the demonstrators during the negotiations that followed.

This political evolution in Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Guinea have a common factor; they all were motivated by grievances about the material conditions of the troops who had served or were serving in ECOMOG.

Furthermore, young officers and former ECOMOG soldiers at the same time perpetrated the coups in Gambia and Sierra Leone. That inadequate allocation of resources to the military is one of the main causes of military complaints is well known, as Alfred Stepan put it:

A (third) conflict area, which is of course always a point of some contention in any model of civil-military relations, concerns the military budget.⁴¹

But these complaints are commonly expressed by senior officers, holding high positions in the hierarchy, where they can assess and defend the military's needs, and where they are close enough to the civilian rulers for expressing them or acting if necessary.

The developments above suggest including the military coups and attempts of coups, that happened in the set of ECOMOG participating countries in the early 1990s, among the outcomes of the organization design of that force. Furthermore, an examination of the evolution of military spending in those countries from 1998 — prior to the Liberian civil war — to the dates of such political events, provides answers to the question why those civil-military relations changed.

Surely, any contingency operation such as providing a military contingent to a country, all other things being equal, causes military expenditures to increase. That could be not the case if downsizing is taking place simultaneously. In the set of ECOMOG participating countries, the trend of downsizing was only observed in Nigeria and Ghana in the 1980s, as Table 5

⁴¹ Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 68.

illustrates it. That was prior to ECOMOG operation. In the other countries, the armed forces' strength either increased, or was stationary when ECOMOG intervened in Liberia. As a general phenomenon, due to inflation, military expenditures were growing in all countries. That is to say a real increase, or to be clearer, an additional increase of military spending should have accompanied those trends, as a result of participating in ECOMOG. That was not the case in Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea, where military coups or attempts occurred. The levels of military spending in those countries kept their normal trend - an inflation-related increase.

COUNTRY	YEAR					
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
NIGERIA	138	138	107	107	94	94
GHANA	9	11	16	16	9	9
SIERRA LEONE	4	6	4	4	5	5
GUINEA	24	24	15	15	15	15
GAMBIA	1	1	1	2	2	2

Table 5: Evolution of the Armed Forces (in thousands).⁴²

To the contrary, in Nigeria and Ghana, substantial increases of military expenditures were observed at certain times during ECOMOG operations, despite the maintaining of constant military strength. Figure 1 provides clear illustration of both trends. Coups or attempts happened where spendings continued to increase at their normal inflation-related rates, and did not happen

when efforts were made to provide the military with resources beyond that level of increase.




Figure 1. Military Expenditures 1988 - 1994 (in Constant 1994 US Dollars).⁴³

Thus, after a period of good military relations in Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia and Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG operation was a turning point, with the

⁴² World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 53 - 102.

return of the military to the political arena in three of them. The two military coups in Sierra Leone and Gambia and the attempt in Guinea were all motivated by former ECOMOG elements' claims for resources. In Ghana and Nigeria where significant supplemental resources were provided to the military, the status quo was observed. Let us recall that the return of an officer to power in Nigeria in 1993 was not a result of a military coup, but rather the result of a legal process. General Abacha as Vice President replaced the President Shonekan after his resignation.

⁴³ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1994, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 53 - 102.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ECOMOG was not a total success, to deserve the role of model for the future of "all African" peace forces, or the one of the permanent West African peace force as many people seem to defend. Neither was ECOMOG a failure, for having stopped the bloodbath when it intervened, for having sometimes imposed cease-fire to Liberian conflicting parties and supervised the election process. But, surely, it could have fulfilled its mandates in a much shorter time, if its effectiveness was not jeopardized by an inadequate composition, a flat and double-edge structure, a discriminatory reward system, a lack of integration in such an important area as intelligence, and sometimes an arbitrary selection of staff members. Yet ECOMOG had substantial advantages such as cultural similarities between contingents and easy interoperability, when compared to the United Nations peace forces.

The 1990s' deterioration of civil-military relations in Sierra Leone, in Gambia and to a certain extent in Guinea, call for a different system of allocating resources to African coalition forces. All things being equal, if ECOMOG had itself managed the contingents' resources, it would not have needed to shift to a participating country, to extinguish a fire that its founders did not think of: resurgence of military contestations and rivalries for power.

The above appraisals should lead to more suitable peace forces in the future. These forces would be able to attain such objectives as effective cease-fire, agreed disarmament of combatants, or perhaps incontestable elections in a reasonable period of time, and without using force.

The following recommendations provide elements toward that direction:

1. Ensure Neutrality of Peace Forces in Establishing Clear Conditions of Eligibility for Participating Countries

Many recent events have demonstrated the increased permeability of physical borders and their limit in compartmentalizing differences between people. Cultural frontiers are at least as meaningful as physical ones, when vital interests are at stake. Huntington has emphasized the important influence of culture in today's international relations:

Trade may or not follow the flag, but culture almost always follows power.⁴⁴

That is truer for African countries whose physical borders were drawn by the colonial rulers. Furthermore, most if not all African disputes evolve along ethnic lines as the Liberian civil war did. The main cause of stalemates in the Liberia peace process was the accusations of partiality pointed to Guinea and Sierra Leone, with which it shares borders; accusations that ECOMOG could hardly deny, given the cultural similarities of some ethnic groups in those countries and the opponents to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. This suggests defining strict conditions of eligibility for participation which should

include, not only not to share territorial borders with the country where the peace force has to operate, but also the absence of major cultural links with it. Such arrangements would provide peace forces with an umbrella against preconceived accusations of partiality.

2. Inflate the Structure of Peace Forces and Delegate Authority in order to Improve their Ability to Quickly Adjust to Changes

Peace forces operate in very uncertain environments and their mandates, formal as well as informal, are likely to change several times as the peace making process goes on. Peace has friends but also enemies who are hardly restricted when they intend to jeopardize it. More than one thousand peacekeepers have been killed during peace operation clashes since the creation of the United Nations. In Liberia, ECOMOG has performed formal mandates — imposition of cease-fire, cantonment and disarmament of combatants and supervision of the electoral process. Its structure and decision making process did not always enable prompt actions, to prevent bitter clashes against the N.P.F.L. combatants. When six of ECOMOG's soldiers were held hostage by N.P.F.L. combatants soon after the 1992 deployment, rapid decisions by both the N.P.F.L. and ECOMOG leaders could have prevented the 24-hour battle between one N.P.F.L. unit and a Senegalese company. By the time the ECOMOG Force Commander and the N.P.F.L. leader got in touch with each other and directed the cease-fire to both sides, the hostages were

⁴⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, N.Y., 1996, p. 91.

executed and many N.P.F.L. elements were killed. Whatever the size of a peace force's zone of action, intermediary level decision making is recommended, such as middle line manager type commanders, in charge of sectors, to whom authority should be delegated for the settlement of any local incidents. Radio, telephone and any other adequate communication means available should link these commanders to conflicting parties' leaders.

3. Do Not Allow the Same Contingents to Participate in Both Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Missions in the Same Theater

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates are fulfilled under different environments, and require different means. Peacekeeping implies that parties in a conflict agree to cease fire, and accept the presence of a pacific and neutral force to guarantee its observance. To the contrary, peace enforcement involves the use of force against an enemy of peace, and consequently requires robust and well-armed units. United Nations experiences in Somalia and Bosnia had proven that shifting the same force from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement — crossing the “Mogadiscio Line” — (and the other way around too) is not workable.

After Ecomog intervened to flush the N.P.F.L. out of Monrovia in 1990, a different force, with a different composition and under a different denomination, should have handled the peacekeeping phase of the Liberian peace process. The fact that the contingents which fought against the N.P.F.L., were supposed to carry out the peacekeeping mandate, explains the stalemates this party

created in the peace process. That led to the call for other contingents and to needless delays.

4. Pool all Logistics at the Force Level and Uniform any On-Site Operation Reward

The flexibility of peace forces depends to a large extent on resource availability. Not pooling logistics cannot jeopardize coalition force effectiveness when participating countries are developed ones. However, in the African context, it is likely to do so because first, African countries' abilities to support contingency operations are too disparate, and second their military capabilities can hardly sustain adequate logistical supports to contingents abroad. When ECOMOG had to deploy through the Liberian territory for the cantonment and disarmament process, only two out of ten battalions had the required logistics. Planning operations were quasi-impossible, given the uncertainty of resource availability. The providing of substantial logistics to the Senegalese contingent by the United States considerably enhanced its operational capabilities but also widened the gap between the Senegalese battalions and the others, what was prejudicial to the overall force readiness. This is why excluding some countries from the African Crisis Response Initiative equipment and training programs for political reasons (that is presently the case for Nigeria) is not suitable. It could induce the opposite of what the programs are supposed to produce - well-trained units able to constitute effective African peace forces.

Managing the logistics at the force level, whatever they are, seems to be the best way to effectively control an African peace force, and reduce the differences at the same time. It could also prevent the return of the military to politics. High morale and equal motivation among contingents are important success factors for a coalition force, which jealousies and frustrations due to differences of treatment in the field are likely to jeopardize. That suggests all operational-related rewards, on-site operation allowances and subsistence allowances to be served to all troops on a uniform basis.

5. Disregard Country Representation and Put the Emphasis on Competencies when Selecting Staff Members

Having all contingents represented at the peace force's headquarters is suitable because it facilitates communication and familiarity between the different components of the force. However, the blind willingness to ensure that can jeopardize the quality of the staff. Peace forces operate in an adaptive manner. They have to constantly watch parties in conflicts, analyze complex situations, foresee possible evolutions and take adequate courses of action in order to influence them positively. The ability to play such roles depends on the competency of staff members. This suggests that staff members be selected carefully. Consciousness, experience, humanitarian qualities and knowledge of international laws should be among their selection criteria. ECOMOG has proven that the Force Commanders, always Nigerian officers, sought to fill the key staff billets with Nigerian officers, even when the adequate resources were

not available, and to provide at the same time each one of the other contingents with a staff billet. Representation was preeminent over any other considerations. Many ECOMOG's mistakes and failures resulted from that. ECOMOG had employed some parties' combatants to help defend against another one, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Tiny ECOMOG elements had been sent to the N.P.F.L. "territory" for cantoning and disarming N.P.F.L. units. Of course, that was rather ECOMOG troops who were cantoned and disarmed.

In fact, representation concerns and competency requirements are reconcilable. The staff billets and the required qualifications can be well defined in advance.

6. Integrate Intelligence and Establish Communication Norms

Differences of values and perceptions between contingents of coalition forces make integration of intelligence important. Information considered to be valuable to a contingent may simply represent a set of data for another contingent because of cultural differences. Communication norms also may vary from culture to culture, even from unit to unit within the same contingent.

Reducing such differences by integrating intelligence and setting up standards of communications is likely to ensure better information and more exhaustive analysis. Intelligence sharing is even more important for African coalition forces, given that individual contingents have very poor intelligence and communication technologies. In Liberia, the use of ECOMOG uniforms by N.P.F.L. combatants to approach Guinean soldiers and shoot on them during the

fight between the ECOMOG and the N.P.F.L. could have been forestalled if the information on the theft of uniforms had been shared and carefully analyzed.

7. Finally, Ensure Continual Training of Peace Forces

Peace forces are disadvantaged by the fact that their components have different backgrounds and different levels of training. They unfortunately have to deal with that when confronting one or several conflicting parties. Training helps reduce differences in the abilities to perform tasks as intended by commanders.

During the 1992 clash against the N.P.F.L., certain ECOMOG units had proven poor combativeness, beside acute coordination problems. This allowed N.P.F.L. units to threaten to enter Monrovia several times.

This suggests permanent training units, with emphasis on areas such as counter-assault exercises, friendly units' structures and equipment, language and communication terminology and humanitarian and international laws.

Their actions would complete planned programs such as A.C.R.I. training components.

The many recent evolvments of peace missions from traditional peacekeeping, to peace enforcement and peace imposition, justify enhanced combat capabilities for peace forces.

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